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Abstract 
 
An effective inflation targeting (IT) regime assumes both a change in the stationarity 
properties of inflation and a lower variability. Within a framework that does not make a 
priori assumptions about the order of integration, we examine whether there is a change 
in the inflation persistence in forty-five, developed and developing, countries and in 
three groups of countries, the G7, the OECD, and OECD Europe. For the inflation 
targeters, we find that the endogenously identified break dates are not consistent with 
the formal adoption of the IT regime. We employ a test for the variability of inflation 
that tracks how frequently inflation variability is in control. Logit analysis reveals that 
inflation targeters do not experience a greater probability than non-inflation targeters of 
inflation persistence changing, and they are not more in control of their inflation 
variability. The quality of institutions emerges as being more significant for taming 
inflation. 
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Non-technical summary  
 
Inflation targeting was introduced in the early 1990s. We revisit the effectiveness of inflation 
targeting three decades later. We employ a methodological framework that does not make an a 
priori assumption about the order of integration. We examine whether there is a change in the 
inflation persistence in forty-five developed and developing countries and in three groups of 
countries, the G7, the OECD, and OECD Europe. For the inflation targeters, we find that the 
endogenously identified break dates are not consistent with the formal adoption of the IT regime. 
We employ a test for the variability of inflation that tracks how frequently inflation variability is 
under control. Logit analysis reveals that inflation targeters do not experience a greater probability 
than non-inflation targeters of inflation persistence changing, and they are not more in control of 
their inflation variability. The quality of institutions emerges as being more significant for taming 
inflation. 
Overall, the evidence provided suggests that (i) a change in the persistence of inflation and (ii) 
lower variability in inflation have both occurred but inflation targeting did not make a statistically 
significant contribution to either. The quality of institutions emerges as a more significant driver of 
the change in the persistence of inflation and of lower inflation variability. Our results do not argue 
against inflation targeting policies, but rather we view the quality of central banks and institutions 
as a vital element in ensuring economic and financial stability since the recent financial crisis, 
where near-zero interest rates are observed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been considerable debate about how effective inflation targeting (IT) is, since it was first 
introduced in the early 1990s. The three decades that have passed since then provide a long enough 
time span for this policy to be assessed more objectively. In October 2011, Ben Bernanke, the then 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, noted that central bankers and 
academics had reached a consensus during the two decades preceding the recent financial crisis on 
the intellectual and institutional framework of monetary policy, and that this broad framework, 
often called flexible inflation targeting, “increased the effective scope of monetary policy” 
(Bernanke, 2011). Recognising that the financial crisis will leave a lasting imprint on the theory and 
practice of central banking, Bernanke (2011) also noted that “with respect to monetary policy, the 
basic principles of flexible inflation targeting – the commitment to a medium-term inflation 
objective, the flexibility to address deviations from full employment, and an emphasis on communi-
cation and transparency – seem destined to survive”. Reflecting on twenty years of inflation 
targeting experience, the former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King (2012) said that “...the 
results in terms of low and stable inflation have been impressive. There have been pronounced 
reductions in the mean, variance and persistence of inflation in Britain and elsewhere”.1 More 
recently, however, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney (2014) argued “that fight [against 
inflation] culminated in the adoption of an inflation target, which helped secure 15 years of price 
stability and sustained economic growth. However, with time, a healthy focus became a dangerous 
distraction”. The debate on the effectiveness of IT is not yet resolved. We approach it as an 
empirical issue.  
Recent academic work
2
 has attempted to assess empirically the effectiveness of adopting an 
inflation-targeting regime.
3
 The seminal work of Ball and Sheridan (2005) focuses on twenty major 
developed OECD countries, seven of which had adopted an IT regime, and by using the standard 
differences in differences approach, conclude that the IT regime does not seem to affect inflation or 
inflation variability in a significant way. The observed inflation drop in the targeting economies is 
mainly ascribed to the mean reversion effect. Inherent in this literature is the challenge that the 
introduction of IT coincides with the great moderation, and distinguishing between the two is far 
from a trivial issue. 
Goncalves and Salles (2008) call the Ball and Sheridan (2005) empirical results “baffling”, given 
that the group of countries investigated is solely comprised of developed economies, and conse-
quently, they argue that sample selection bias has contaminated the reported results. Goncalves and 
Salles (2008), using the same methodological framework, attempt to overcome the selection bias 
problem by examining a sample of thirty-six emerging economies, thirteen of which have adopted 
an IT regime. The findings of Goncalves and Salles (2008) stood in contrast to those suggested by 
Ball and Sheridan (2005), as they conclude that IT delivers irrefutable gains in inflation and growth 
volatility for developing economies. 
                                                 
1
 An official announcement of the target increases the credibility of the policy of the Central Bank, alleviates the 
dynamic incontinency problem, anchors expectations, and secures price stability. 
2
 The literature on IT is extensive and reviewing it is outside the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive review, 
see Svensson (2010). For more recent literature on the relationship between macroprudential policy and IT see Kim and 
Mehrotra (2017), for the effect of IT on the housing market see Frappa and Mésonnier (2010) and the references 
therein. 
3
 Opponents of IT argue that it is merely conservative window dressing (Romer, 2006; p532), or it reflects a more 
general process of reforms (Gertler, 2005) such as central bank independence (Kohn, 2005) or the Central Bank’s 
communication policy (Mankiw, 2005). 
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Lin and Ye (2007) apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to twenty-two major 
industrial countries
4
, taking this way into account the problem of self-selection in the adoption of 
the IT regime. Additionally, they show, for industrial countries, that the IT policy has no effect on 
inflation, inflation variability, long-term interest rates or the income velocity of money. Lin and Ye 
(2009) use the propensity score matching methodological framework again and focus on fifty-two 
developing countries for the period 1985 to 2005. They find that the IT regime is effective, since it 
appears to be a significant parameter in lowering both inflation and inflation variability in 
developing countries. Their results confirm the earlier empirical findings of Goncalves and Salles 
(2008). However, Brito and Bystedt (2010) fail to find any evidence that IT improves economic 
performance for developing countries. 
Several studies have tested the level of inflation for stationarity by employing either linear or 
nonlinear unit root tests. This strand of the literature, which is more relevant for our line of work, 
draws from Svensson (1997), who argues that IT implies the base drift of the price level, suggesting 
that the price level has a unit root and inflation is stationary. Culver and Papell (1997) employ 
sequential break and panel unit root tests for the inflation rates of thirteen OECD countries. Based 
on individual country tests, they find stationarity in only four cases, while in the panel dimension, 
the non-rejection of the unit root for inflation is very fragile. Hassler and Wolters (1995) examine 
monthly inflation rates for five industrial countries and employ fractional unit root tests. In all 
cases, the difference parameter is different both from one and from zero. Gregoriou and Kontonikas 
(2006) look at five OECD countries (the UK, Canada, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand) and 
two high inflation non-OECD countries, Chile and Israel. The sample starts from the introduction of 
the IT regime in each country until 2004. The ADF test fails to reject the non-stationarity 
hypothesis, but the Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive (ESTAR) unit root test points 
towards stationarity (in non-linear mean reversion) which indicates that targeting has been 
successful. Altissimo et al. (2006) provide evidence that the properties of the sectoral and aggregate 
inflation dynamics in the euro area have changed over time. Arestis et al. (2014) examine the 
stationarity properties of inflation differentials and find that they converge irrespective of the 
monetary policy framework. 
This paper takes a different approach, as we do not make any assumption about the stationarity 
properties of the entire sample but rather, we examine a possible change both in the persistence of 
inflation and in the variability of inflation. In the spirit of Svensson (1997), we search for changes 
in persistence where the following four scenarios may occur and can be tested: (i) inflation is 
integrated of order one (denoted I(1)) throughout the sample; (ii) inflation is integrated of order zero 
(denoted I(0)) and it remains so; (iii) there is a change in persistence from I(0) to I(1); and (iv) there 
is change from I(1) to I(0). In the latter two scenarios, the employed testing procedure can date the 
break, meaning it can be compared with the date inflation targeting was formally introduced.  
The starting point for our analysis is like that of Halunga et al. (2009), as they employ a change 
in persistence test for inflation in the US and the UK. They find a change in the persistence of 
inflation from I(0) to I(1) in the early 1970s, with a subsequent reversion in the early 1980s. Within 
this framework, we examine forty-five countries, twenty-five of which are IT countries,
5
 operating 
in a sequential way. Our analysis begins with tests for a change in inflation persistence. Once we 
verify a significant change from I(1) to I(0), we then compare the Estimated Break Date (EBD) with 
                                                 
4 
Seven of the industrial countries examined were inflation targeters.  
5
 In different frameworks, Ball and Sheridan (2005) use data from twenty industrialised countries, Lin and Ye 
(2007) from twenty-two industrialised countries, and Lin and Ye (2009) from thirteen developing countries. Fazio et al. 
(2015) look at seventy countries and compare the banking sectors of IT countries and non-IT countries. 
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the date that corresponds to the formal adoption (FAD) of the inflation targeting regime. We then 
proceed by employing a logit model to assess whether IT affects the probability of a change in 
persistence occurring in the inflation rate. We find no evidence in favour of IT being significant.  
In line with the seminal contribution of North (1990) and the subsequent literature, we also 
consider the quality of institutions as a potential driver of the change in the persistence of inflation. 
The quality of institutions emerges as more significant for taming inflation than IT is. Additionally, 
we compare the variability of inflation in the targeters against the non-targeters. Logit analysis 
again reveals that inflation targeters are not more in control with respect to the variability of 
inflation than non-targeters are. In short, the quality of institutions appears to be more important for 
inflation and the variability of inflation. 
We do not interpret our results as an argument against inflation targeting. We can reiterate the 
concluding remark of Ball and Sheridan (2005): “Our results do not provide an argument against 
inflation targeting, for we have not found that it does any harm”. Rather, we view the quality of 
central banks and institutions as a vital element in ensuring economic and financial stability. Indeed, 
central banks need to work more closely with a range of institutions, including the government, in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis and given the presence of near-zero interest rates. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric methodology. Section 3 
presents the data and Section 4 reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Change in inflation persistence 
 
To examine formally whether there has been a change in the inflation persistence from I(1) to I(0) 
and vice versa, we use the modified Busetti and Taylor (2004) test statistics, suggested by Harvey et 
al. (2006) and implemented empirically on US and UK inflation by Halunga et al. (2009). To test 
the null hypothesis of a constant I(0) process against a change in persistence from I(0) to I(1) for an 
unknown breakpoint, Busetti and Taylor (2004) originally proposed the following statistics:  
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where, τ(0,1), [τl , τu] is a sub-interval of (0,1), T is the sample size and 0,ˆ i  and 1,ˆ i  are the OLS 
residuals from the regression of the series being examined on a constant for the samples t = 
1,…,[τΤ] and t= [τΤ],…,T, respectively.  
To test for a change from I(1) to I(0) under the same null hypothesis, Busetti and Taylor (2004) 
propose using the reciprocal of  M K . The equivalents of equations (1), (2) and (3) are denoted 
by   1/j MH K , with j= 1, 2, 3. However, these statistics are severely oversized when the true 
generating process is constantly I(1). For this reason, Harvey et al. (2006) suggested testing the null 
of a constant I(0) or I(1) generating process against a change from I(0) to I(1) with the following 
modification:  
       min,min expj M j MjH bJ H  K K       with j = 1, 2, 3     (5) 
where   
,minj M j
H K  is the modified statistic, b is a constant provided by Harvey et al. (2006) 
and min [ , ] 1,[ ]min l u TJ J    , with 1,[ ]TJ   equal to 
1T   times the Wald statistic that corresponds to 
the test of the joint 1 9... 0k      hypothesis, in the regression that is illustrated below: 
9
1
, 1, ,[ ]it t i ti ky t u t T       x              (6) 
When the alternative hypothesis being examined is in the opposite direction, from I(1) to I(0), 
the   j MH K  statistic in equation (5) is substituted by   1/j MH K  and the 1,[ ]TJ   factor is 
replaced by 
min [ , ] [ ],
min
l u
R
T TJ J    , where [ ],T TJ   is defined as 1,[ ]TJ   with the exception that 
specification (6) is now estimated for t= [τΤ],…,T. The modified statistic is denoted by 
  
,min
1/j M J
H K .
 
To estimate the location of the breakpoint for a change that might be either from I(0) to I(1) or 
from I(1) to I(0), Busetti and Taylor (2004) propose (7) and (8) respectively: 
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2
1,
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t   are defined as previously.      (9) 
At first, we set the search interval for the identification of the break point at [0.20, 0.80]. In cases 
where there is a significant change in the persistence but the breakpoint identified is located at an 
extreme of the search interval, we amend the search interval to [0.15, 0.85] and the tests for a 
change in persistence are re-estimated for the extended search interval. In cases where there is no 
evidence of a significant change in the persistence however, we disregard the extreme break point 
and the testing procedure does not proceed for the extended search interval. 
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2.2 Analysis of inflation variability 
 
Following from the change in persistence testing, we identify shifts in variance, as IT could affect 
both the mean and the variance of inflation. To do this we follow on a rolling basis the methodology 
proposed by Hawkins and Zamba (2005). Specifically, for a given sample of size n  and near 
normally distributed data, they utilise the generalised likelihood ratio principle to identify a possible 
change in variance at time   by the maximum value of the ,k nG  statistic across the entire set of the 
possible values for k . Hence, the generalised likelihood ratio statistic of interest is: 
max, ,
2 2
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2 2
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where 
2ˆ  is the estimate of the common variance for the two periods, 21ˆ  and 
2
2ˆ  are the sample 
variances for the first and second period respectively, and C  is the Bartlett correction factor.  
This static setting is useful when we examine the in-control hypothesis for a sample of size n and 
has variance homogeneity. The same framework is also suitable for monitoring changes in variance 
when the sample is updated with new information and the variance change may occur at any point 
in time. As new information arrives, the max,nG  statistic is recalculated and it is compared to a 
critical limit , nh . If max, ,n nG h , there is evidence that the process is in-control, whereas if 
max, ,n nG h , the opposite is true and it is out of control. By simulating five million random 
samples ranging from 10 to 500 observations for several levels of significance ( ), Hawkins and 
Zamba (2005) propose the following formula for approximating the critical limit , nh :    
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2.3 Logit analysis 
 
Following from these two tests, we examine three additional hypotheses. First, we examine whether 
a significant change in the persistence from I(1) to I(0) is associated with those countries that follow 
an inflation-targeting policy. Second, we investigate whether the significant changes identified in 
the variability of inflation are less frequent in the inflation-targeting countries than in the rest. 
Third, we test whether inflation targeters can both achieve a change in the persistence of inflation 
and control the change of inflation variability at the same time. As a result, our analysis has some 
subsequent steps. In particular, we employ three distinct logit specifications to assess whether the 
probability of observing (i) a change in persistence for the inflation series from I(1) to I(0), (ii) more 
control in the changes of the inflation variability, and (iii) both (i) and (ii), depends on whether a 
country follows an inflation targeting policy.  
These hypotheses, as already mentioned, can be investigated within a binary choice framework, 
modelled by a cross-section logit regression specified as: 
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 , , ,0 ,1 , ,2 ,ln 1        j i j i j j IT i j i j ib b D b Q     (12) 
 
where i  ( 1,...,45i ) denotes the country and j  ( 1,2,3j ) denotes the hypothesis being examined 
each time. So for the first specification, 1, i  is the probability of country i  experiencing a 
significant change in persistence from I(1) to I(0) for the annualised inflation series, while the 
interpretation for 2, i  and 3, i  is similar.  
Since the , j i  for each country is non-observable, we proceed by employing three binary 
variables ,j iD  ( 1,2,3j ). The dummy that corresponds to the first hypothesis, 1,iD , receives the 
value of 1 if a significant change in persistence for country i   is confirmed jointly by the three 
statistics in equations (1), (2) and (3) at any conventional level of significance, and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, the dummy that is associated with the second hypothesis, 2,iD , receives the value of 1 if 
country i  has on average larger percentage of time, relative to other countries, under which the 
variability of inflation is in-control (more than the median) and 0 otherwise. The last dummy, 3,iD ,  
which reflects the third hypothesis, is the product of 1,iD  and 2,iD , showing both the change in 
persistence and control over inflation variability. Furthermore, ,IT iD  is a dichotomous dummy 
variable that indicates whether country i  is an inflation targeter or not, iQ  is the quality of 
institutions, ,0jb , ,1jb  and ,2jb  are coefficients to be estimated, and i  is the error term.  
Naturally, significant and positive values for the ,1jb  coefficients would indicate that inflation-
targeting countries perform better than non-inflation targeting countries in the three hypotheses 
being examined (that is, change in persistence, control over inflation variability, and jointly a 
change in persistence and control over variability). Moreover, all the alternative outcomes related to 
the sign and the significance of the ,1jb  coefficient provide evidence in favour of the great 
moderation proposition. A statistically significant ,2jb  would gauge the contribution of the quality 
of institutions at taming inflation. At this point it is also worth pointing out that no statement about 
causality can be derived. 
Lastly, we will also consider alternative drivers that could explain the left-hand side variable in 
equation (12). North’s (1990) seminal thesis provides the foundation for the role of institutions in 
economic performance. In our case, we will examine whether the quality of institutions can affect 
the stationarity properties (change in persistence) of inflation. As a result, we will augment the 
specification and consider the quality of institutions as quantified by the World Bank on the right-
hand side. 
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3. Data  
 
To investigate the effectiveness of inflation targeting policies, we focus on forty-five countries and 
on three groups of countries (the G7, the OECD, and OECD Europe), providing forty-eight series. 
We employ monthly time series data for annualised inflation over the period 1980:1 to 2010:6.
6,7
 
Annualised inflation is the logarithmic difference in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The source of 
the data is the International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund and the 
Main Economic Indicators database of the OECD.
8
 Annualised inflation rates are presented in Fig-
ure 1. The summary statistics for all inflation series together with the related ADF unit-root test 
results appear in Table 1. 
We approximate the quality of institutions by the Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) ob-
tained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database of the World Bank.
9
 The GEI 
receives values from 2.5 (weak effectiveness) to 2.5 (strong effectiveness) and it is available from 
1996. The index captures perceptions of the quality of public and civil services, and the degree of 
their independence from political pressures. It also reflects the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. We capture 
the quality of institutions for each country by the average value of the GEI for the period 1996 to 
2010. We report the GEI data in the Appendix (see Table A2). 
  
                                                 
6
 Exceptions are Australia and New Zealand since monthly observations are not available. For these two countries, 
we use annualised inflation at quarterly frequency for the period 1980:Q1 to 2010:Q2. 
7
 The sample does not incorporate the more recent period where unconventional monetary policies were in 
operation. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many commentators have argued that inflation targeting is an idea 
whose time has passed and that it has proven inadequate in turbulent times (Frankel, 2012 and El-Erian, 2012). Carney 
(2012) explained the advantages of a nominal GDP target; see also McCallum (2015). 
8
 The MEI database has been used as source of data only for the following countries or groups of countries: OECD 
total, OECD Europe, G7 countries, China, Germany and Ireland.  
9
 According to WGI: “The GEI reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” 
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Figure 1: Annualised inflation  
Notes: see below.  
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Figure 1: Annualised inflation, continued 
Notes: see below.  
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Figure 1: Annualised inflation, continued  
Notes: a) For the vast majority of the countries, the sample we examine extends from 1980:01 to 2010:06 (monthly frequency) and 
includes 366 observations. Exceptions, due to a lack of data, are the following countries: Slovakia (1994:01 to 2010:06), Slovenia 
(1991:01 to 2010:06), Czech Republic (1994:01 to 2010:06), Iceland (1984:01 to 2010:06), Romania (1991:10 to 2010:06) and China 
(1994:01 to 2010:06). b) For Australia and New Zealand, no monthly observations are available. Therefore, we use quarterly data for 
the period 1980:Q1 to 2010:Q2. c) the vertical axis, in each graph, measures the percentage change in the CPI and the horizontal axis 
measures time. d) H1, H2, and H3 denote the three alternative statistics we use to test for a change in persistence. We present these 
statistics analytically in Section 2 (see equations 1, 2 and 3). e) I(1) implies non-stationary for the series of interest (the grey area in 
the graph), while I(0) suggests stationarity (the white area in the graph). f) The symbols ***, ** and * signify a change in persistence 
from I(1) to I(0) at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. g) To estimate the location of the break date for a change 
from I(1) to I(0) we use equation 8 (see section 2). h) Finally, we also communicate in more detail the test results for a change in 
persistence in Table 2 below.  
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Table 1: Full sample summary statistics and ADF unit-root testing  
Country Sample Mean Max. Min. St. Dev. ADF-stat. 
(p-value) 
 
euro area countries  
Austria  1980m01–2010m06 2.72  7.40  –0.27  1.62  –2.68 (0.077)  
Belgium 1980m01–2010m06 3.03  9.85  –1.68  2.26  –1.86 (0.351)  
Cyprus 1980m01–2010m06 4.12  16.55  –1.22  2.82  –3.62 (0.006)  
Finland 1980m01–2010m06 3.68  13.76  –1.55  3.33  –2.92 (0.043)  
France 1980m01–2010m06 3.63  14.31  –0.72  3.67  –3.46 (0.009)  
Germany  1980m01–2010m06 2.33  7.45  –0.99  1.68  –2.39 (0.143)  
Greece 1980m01–2010m06 11.14  26.99  0.49  7.90  –1.56 (0.498)  
Ireland  1980m01–2010m06 4.81  23.15  –6.56  5.32  –2.48 (0.121)  
Italy 1980m01–2010m06 5.85  22.08  0.00  5.32  –3.73 (0.004)  
Luxembourg  1980m01–2010m06 3.08  10.75  –1.41  2.39  –1.89 (0.334)  
Malta 1980m01–2010m05 2.98  17.44  –3.36  3.42  –4.41 (0.000)  
Netherlands  1980m01–2010m06 2.45  7.32  –1.29  1.67  –2.86 (0.050)  
Portugal  1980m01–2010m06 8.61  33.88  –1.59  8.01  –1.25 (0.653)  
Slovakia 1994m01–2010m06 6.55  16.54  0.40  3.80  –2.42 (0.136)  
Slovenia  1991m01–2010m06 25.54  323.70  –0.58  59.03  –20.53 (0.000)  
Spain 1980m01–2010m06 5.73  16.90  –1.40  4.07  –2.34 (0.159)  
Inflation-targeting countries  
Australia 1980Q01–2010Q02 4.66  12.32  –0.33  0003.24 –1.91 (0.324)  
Brazil 1980m12–2010m06 447.28  6821.28  1.64  1012.41 –3.84 (0.002)  
Canada 1980m01–2010m06 3.58  12.86  –0.94  0002.96 –2.89 (0.047)  
Chile 1980m01–2010m06 12.22  39.90  –2.26  0009.86 –2.37 (0.150)  
Colombia 1980m01–2010m06 17.06  32.36  1.82  0009.01 –0.67 (0.849)  
Czech Rep. 1994m01–2010m06 4.72  13.44  –0.40  0003.61 –1.49 (0.535)  
Ghana 1980m01–2010m06 31.61  174.14  1.13  0029.71 –3.32 (0.014)  
Hungary 1980m01–2010m06 12.33  39.20  2.28  0008.61 –1.40 (0.580)  
Iceland 1984m01–2010m06 9.88  70.79  –0.05  0010.46 –3.18 (0.022)  
Indonesia 1980m01–2010m06 10.95  82.40  –1.09  0011.32 –3.84 (0.002)  
Israel 1980m01–2010m06 47.74  486.22  –2.74  0092.77 –2.35 (0.156)  
Korea 1980m01–2010m06 5.72  34.55  0.16  0005.78 –4.97 (0.000)  
Mexico 1980m01–2010m06 31.49  179.73  2.91  0037.01 –2.11 (0.238)  
New Zealand 1980Q01–2010Q02 5.50  18.94  –0.49  0005.45 –2.14 (0.228)  
Norway 1980m01–2010m06 4.26  14.80  –1.83  0003.42 –2.76 (0.063)  
Peru 1980m01–2010m06 434.89  12377.80  –1.11  1491.95 –3.57 (0.006)  
Philippines 1980m01–2010m06 9.69  63.81  –1.77  0009.78 –3.14 (0.024)  
Poland 1989m01–2010m06 62.48  1173.27  0.07  0192.69 –9.27 (0.000)  
Romania 1991m10–2010m06 63.21  316.97  3.65  0080.29 –2.26 (0.184)  
South Africa 1980m01–2010m06 10.14  20.94  0.16  0004.65 –1.31 (0.621)  
Sweden 1980m01–2010m06 4.19  15.57  –1.55  0003.92 –2.16 (0.219)  
Switzerland 1980m01–2010m06 2.17  7.48  –1.18  0001.90 –2.14 (0.227)  
Thailand 1980m01–2010m06 4.40  24.51  –4.38  0004.04 –4.12 (0.001)  
Turkey 1980m01–2010m06 50.31  140.91  5.07  0030.72 –0.97 (0.761)  
UK 1980m01–2010m06 4.58  21.93  –1.56  0003.64 –3.69 (0.004)  
Other countries & Groups  
China 1994m01–2010m02 4.26  27.70  –2.20  07.00 –4.09 (0.001)  
Denmark  1980m01–2010m06 3.68  14.32  0.74  02.97 –3.47 (0.009)  
Japan 1980m01–2010m06 1.13  8.73  –2.53  01.95 –3.77 (0.003)  
US 1980m01–2010m06 3.68  14.68  –2.09  02.62 –3.88 (0.002)  
G7 1980m01–2010m06 3.37  13.43  –1.43  02.58 –4.13 (0.001)  
OECD EU 1980m01–2010m06 6.75  18.30  0.50  03.42 –2.28 (0.178)  
OECD 1980m01–2010m06 5.74  15.78  –0.62  03.22 –2.48 (0.119)  
Notes: a) in the sample column, the first date is the start of the sample while the second is the end of the sample. b) m denotes data 
at monthly frequency and Q denotes data at quarterly frequency. The subsequent number denotes the month or quarter that the 
sample starts or ends in. c) ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. d) in the implementation of the ADF test we assume no-
trend in the test equation and for the selection of the lag-length we use the Schwarz information criterion. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Change in inflation persistence 
 
Our analysis starts with the full sample unit root tests. Given the mixed results of the ADF test in 
Table 1 (literature finds that the stationarity properties of inflation are not constant, see Halunga et 
al. 2009), we test for a change in persistence. We show the results in Table 2. These results include 
the sample employed and the three statistics for the two hypotheses of (i) change from I(0) to I(1) 
and (ii) change from I(1) to I(0), together with the estimated break date. In fourteen out of sixteen 
euro-area countries, there is a change from I(1) to I(0), with Slovenia and Slovakia the exceptions. 
The next group is the IT countries, and the I(1) to I(0) change is supported in twenty out of twenty-
five of them, while the results are mixed in the remaining countries (Columbia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
S. Africa and Turkey). The last section in Table 2 includes China, Denmark, Japan and the US, and 
the three groups of countries G7, OECD Europe, and OECD. The results for China are inconclusive 
as the sample is limited, but in the other six cases, evidence for a change from I(1) to I(0) emerges.  
Overall, inflation appears as I(1) in the early part of the sample (80s) and becomes I(0) after a 
critical point, which is referred to as the Estimated Break Date (EBD). In Figure 2 we compare the 
differences in months between the EBD and the Formal Adoption Date (FAD) for the IT countries. 
If the EBD and the FAD are close, it would translate into short horizontal bars. In twelve countries, 
the EBD precedes the FAD, doing so by 109 months in New Zealand for instance, while it lags the 
FAD in the rest twelve countries. Extreme cases are Thailand, the Philippines, and Korea, where the 
EBD lags the FAD by 184, 177 and 163 months. Obviously, these results do not give conclusive 
evidence on how the two dates overlap. In total, we find equal numbers of countries where the EBD 
precedes the FAD and where it lags the FAD.
10
 Visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests that there is 
only proximity in the two dates for Romania and Hungary. We also supplement Figure 2 with some 
summary statistics in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
10
 Brazil is not included as the EBD is an extreme point. For Australia and New Zealand, quarters are converted to 
months. 
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Table 2: Change in persistence testing 
Country  Break date Statistics for testing I(0)→I(1)  Break date Statistics for testing I(1)→I(0) 
 H1(K Μ (.))min H2(K Μ (.))min H3(K Μ (.))min  H1(K Μ (.))min H2(K Μ (.))min H3(K Μ (.))min 
Euro-zone countries   
           
Austria  2004m06 e 000.134*** 000.038*** 0.014*  1987m05 087.073*** 030.455*** 039.343*** 
Belgium  2004m06 e 000.028*** 000.006*** 0.002*  1987m10 144.839*** 075.477*** 067.742*** 
Cyprus  2004m06 e 000.058*** 000.027*** 0.010*  1987m03 079.357*** 035.680*** 035.732*** 
Finland  2004m06 e 000.095*** 000.015*** 0.004*  1994m05 083.397*** 045.496*** 036.660*** 
France  2004m06 e 000.009*** 000.001*** 0.000*  1992m05 478.584*** 232.202*** 229.055*** 
Germany  2004m06 e 000.057*** 000.025*** 0.008*  1994m03 040.115*** 017.167*** 016.927*** 
Greece  1986m02 e 011.102*** 002.923*** 3.914*  1999m10 247.639*** 048.409*** 108.655*** 
Ireland  2004m06 e 000.013*** 000.008*** 0.002*  1987m06 018.452*** 013.561*** 007.513*** 
Italy  1986m02 e 000.002*** 000.000*** 0.000*  1996m09 664.274*** 235.192*** 328.272*** 
Luxembourg  2004m06 e 000.018*** 000.004*** 0.001*  1988m04 147.160*** 062.256*** 067.814*** 
Malta  2004m06 e 000.002*** 000.001*** 0.000*  1986m05 181.266*** 090.587*** 085.549*** 
Netherlands  2000m12 e 000.012*** 000.008*** 0.001*  1988m06 060.488*** 013.874*** 026.200*** 
Portugal  1986m02 e 002.871*** 000.287*** 0.334*  1995m10 076.208*** 030.398*** 032.446*** 
Slovakia  1999m06 e 009.634*** 002.294*** 2.862*  2004m12 002.191*** 000.560*** 000.407*** 
Slovenia  2007m06 e 000.439*** 000.173*** 0.063*    1998m01 e 002.454*** 001.438*** 000.786*** 
Spain  2004m06 e 000.317*** 000.039*** 0.014*  1995m07 078.909*** 037.857*** 035.696*** 
           
Inflation-targeting countries 
           
Australia  1986Q03 e 000.918*** 000.142*** 000.074***  2001Q02 799.178*** 140.774*** 392.197*** 
Brazil †  2002m11 e 000.359*** 000.141*** 000.050***    2007m07 e 022.772*** 003.471*** 008.597*** 
Canada  2004m06 e 000.003*** 000.001*** 000.000***  1995m01 163.941*** 077.138*** 077.101*** 
Chile  1989m11 e 013.390*** 003.123*** 004.755***  1997m04 067.754*** 029.205*** 029.743*** 
Colombia  1988m03 e 043.726*** 013.075*** 018.853***  2003m09 113.813*** 011.254*** 049.018*** 
Czech Rep.  1998m01 e 007.077*** 000.257*** 001.155***  1999m12 016.628*** 007.914*** 006.387*** 
Ghana  1995m03 e 000.265*** 000.104*** 000.051***  2004m01 307.032*** 035.878*** 145.705*** 
Hungary  1987m07 e 768.189*** 065.894*** 367.710***  2001m09 295.583*** 042.756*** 136.369*** 
Iceland  2005m03 e 000.377*** 000.089*** 000.039***  1993m01 014.401*** 007.581*** 005.069*** 
Indonesia  1997m12 e 024.433*** 004.255*** 008.278***  2000m06 045.793*** 005.721*** 018.221*** 
           
Notes: (a) ***, ** and * denote a change in persistence at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. (b) The subscript e signifies that the identified breakpoint is 
located on an extreme of the initial search interval [0.20–0.80]. (c) The superscript † implies that an extreme breakpoint is also combined with a significant change in the 
persistence. In these cases, we amend the search interval to [0.15–0.85] and the tests for a change in persistence are implemented from the beginning. (d) On those cases where 
there is no evidence of a significant change in the persistence, given the identification of an extreme breakpoint, then the extreme breakpoint is disregarded and the testing 
procedure is not repeated for the extended search interval.   
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Table 2: Change in persistence testing, continued 
Country  Break date Statistics for testing I(0)→I(1)  Break date Statistics for testing I(1)→I(0) 
 H1(K Μ (.))min H2(K Μ (.))min H3(K Μ (.))min  H1(K Μ (.))min H2(K Μ (.))min H3(K Μ (.))min 
Inflation-targeting countries (continued)   
           
Israel   1986m02 e 00.016*** 0.003** 00.001***  1999m08 926.556*** 586.374*** 676.896*** 
Korea†  2005m11 e  00.024*** 0.002** 00.004***  1984m09 581.440*** 142.162*** 281.137*** 
Mexico   1986m05 e 03.838*** 0.339** 00.429***  2001m10 724.031*** 337.753*** 373.500*** 
N. Zealand  1986Q03 e 01.486*** 0.115** 00.073***  1999Q04 958.553*** 256.141*** 564.051*** 
Norway  2003m12 e 00.033*** 0.005** 00.001***  1992m09 258.789*** 139.025*** 125.209*** 
Peru   2006m11 e 00.000*** 0.000** 00.000***  1998m12 641.159*** 208.118*** 227.242*** 
Philippines  2004m06 e 00.434*** 0.132** 00.066***  1987m04 162.917*** 041.325*** 076.607*** 
Poland  1993m05 e 00.004*** 0.005** 00.000***  2001m08 261.734*** 306.316*** 192.123*** 
Romania  1995m07 e 00.197*** 0.033** 00.012***  2006m03 102.608*** 154.718*** 037.065*** 
S. Africa†  1985m01 e 67.162*** 5.794** 28.631***  2000m03 010.548*** 003.726*** 003.568*** 
Sweden  1986m02 e 00.528*** 0.089** 00.036***  1990m02 192.208*** 062.820*** 088.167*** 
Switzerland  1986m02 e 01.461*** 0.294** 00.155***  1994m10 131.723*** 045.908*** 061.252*** 
Thailand†  2005m11 e 00.012*** 0.013** 00.003***  1985m01 017.372*** 007.760*** 006.030*** 
Turkey  1994m03 e 10.746*** 4.555** 03.029***  2004m03 263.594*** 097.625*** 123.579*** 
UK  2004m06 e 00.016*** 0.006** 00.001***  1991m07 100.182*** 060.403*** 046.175*** 
           
Other countries & Groups 
           
China  2006m12 e 00.000*** 0.000** 00.000***  1999m06 010.250*** 007.069*** 003.678*** 
Denmark   2004m06 e 00.009*** 0.001** 00.000***  1990m03 545.549*** 302.392*** 263.543*** 
Japan  2004m06 e 00.081*** 0.035** 00.010***  1992m09 052.361*** 016.131*** 022.663*** 
US  2004m06 e  00.002*** 0.001** 00.000***  1987m01 071.582*** 038.464*** 032.731*** 
G7  2004m04 e 00.000*** 0.000** 00.000***  1992m04 175.663*** 084.571*** 082.724*** 
OECD EU  1994m07 e 00.025*** 0.025** 00.004***  2002m12 116.406*** 012.696*** 052.345*** 
OECD  1986m02 e 00.184*** 0.064** 00.018***  1998m07 136.591*** 027.647*** 062.882*** 
Notes: (a) ***, ** and * denote a change in persistence at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. (b) The subscript e signifies that the identified breakpoint is 
located on an extreme of the initial search interval [0.20–0.80]. (c) The superscript † implies that an extreme breakpoint is also combined with a significant change in the 
persistence. In these cases, we amend the search interval to [0.15–0.85] and the tests for a change in persistence are implemented from the beginning. (d) On those cases where 
there is no evidence of a significant change in the persistence, given the identification of an extreme breakpoint, then the extreme breakpoint is disregarded and the testing 
procedure is not repeated for the extended search interval.   
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Figure 2: Difference between the formal adoption date and the estimated break date 
Notes: (a) Figures within parentheses denote the time difference in months between the formal adoption date and the estimated break 
date for all the inflation targeting countries, (b) *** denotes a 0.01 significant change in persistence provided that there is agreement 
among the three alternative tests, (c) Brazil is excluded since the estimated break date has been found to be an extreme breakpoint.   
 
4.2 Analysis of inflation variability 
 
We proceed by analysing inflation variability, which is summarised in Table A1 (see the 
Appendix). This table presents the observations and the variance of inflation before and after the 
FAD and the EBD for both IT and non-IT countries. In the same table, we also test for a possible 
change in the observed variance of inflation. For the IT countries, the pre-specified point in time is 
the FAD, while for the remaining countries we use the EBD.
11
 As the standard F-test requires 
normality and the inflation series are far from normal,
12
 we test for change in the variance of 
inflation using the statistic proposed by Brown and Forsythe (1974). The Brown and Forsythe 
(1974) test employs the median as a measure of central tendency instead of the mean. The test 
remains robust against non-normality, preserving at the same time a desirable level of statistical 
power (Conover et al., 1981). Overall, the results in Table A1 provide overwhelming support for a 
change in the variance of inflation that is related to FAD or EBD as the pre-specified point in time. 
All the countries except Indonesia appear to experience a significant decrease in the variance of 
inflation that can be taken as related to the great moderation. This means we cannot compare IT and 
non-IT countries to look at how effective the IT regime is in controlling the variance of inflation. 
Hence, we focus on the changes in the variability of inflation and use the methodology proposed by 
Hawkins and Zamba (2005). This allows us to determine the percentage of time that the changes in 
the variability of inflation are in-control. If IT is an effective policy framework, it would be 
expected that inflation targeters can control more effectively the change in the variability of 
                                                 
11
 For countries with no significant change in the persistence of inflation, we split the sample into two equal parts.    
12
 Looking at the empirical distribution of the data, we test for normality in the inflation series with Watson’s (1961) 
U
2
 test statistic. See Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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inflation, as measured by MAD, than other countries do. As such, the variability of inflation should 
be in-control in inflation targeters for a higher proportion of time on average than it is in the other 
countries.  
It is worth noting that the number of countries in the two groups we examine are relatively 
balanced, with 25 inflation targeters and 20 non-inflation targeters. Given this, if we define a central 
cut-off point in the distribution of the percentages in which the process is in-control, we would 
expect most of countries in the upper half of the distribution to be inflation targeters. In this case the 
cut-off point at the median becomes a critical threshold that separates the countries into two groups. 
The first group, in the upper part of the distribution, contains countries that control inflation 
variability more effectively and as such, IT countries might be expected to be over-represented in 
this group. The lower part of the distribution, which is less effective at controlling inflation 
variability, is expected to contain more non-IT countries. 
We apply this framework to our case as follows. First, we estimate the variability of inflation on 
a rolling basis by employing a fixed window of 24 observations and taking the Median Absolute 
Deviation (MAD). We select the MAD over other alternatives like standard deviation since it 
remains robust to outliers. Having obtained the rolling estimates of MAD, we calculate the max,nG  
statistic for the log-change of MAD to identify a possible shift in variance using an initial 
benchmark window of 48 observations.
13
 Once the first max,nG  statistic is obtained, we monitor the 
changes in variance by rolling the window and retaining the size fixed. As the window moves 
towards the end of the sample, we evaluate a new max,nG  statistic for every new observation that 
enters the window. Provided that max, ,n nG h ,  the process is in-control and we can compute the 
percentage of time that the process is in-control for each country. The results for each country are 
presented in Figure 3.
14
 To determine the central cut-off point in the distribution of the percentages 
we use the median. The central cut-off point that separates the countries into two groups is 79%, 
meaning that countries are in control of inflation variability 79% of the time.
15
 We may argue, 
therefore, that countries with a percentage greater than 79% are those that control the variability of 
inflation more effectively than the other countries. 
 
4.3 Logit analysis 
 
To examine the three hypotheses introduced in section 2.3, we estimate equation (12) using the ap-
propriate binary variable as a dependent variable. From a sample of 45 countries, we present the 
estimates of the three cross-sectional specifications in Table 3. For the first hypothesis of a signifi-
cant change in the persistence associated with the IT countries, the coefficient of the IT dummy  
( ,IT iD ) is positive (2.647) and insignificant at the conventional levels of significance (specification 
1 in Table 3). These results suggest that IT countries face a similar probability of a significant 
change in inflation persistence from I(1) to I(0) to that faced by non-IT countries. The quality of 
institutions emerges as significant for the changes observed in the persistence of inflation at the 0.05 
significance level.   
                                                 
13
 By taking account of the existence of outliers (MAD is robust to outliers) and by removing trends using the 
change in MAD, the series that are finally obtained are made approximately normal. 
14
 We also present the percentage of time that the changes in the variability of inflation are in-control for each 
country in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
15
 By using the mean to determine the central cut-off point, the value is 79.2%. 
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Figure 3: Rolling test for variance homogeneity in the MAD change of inflation 
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Figure 3: Rolling test for variance homogeneity in the MAD change of inflation, continued  
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Figure 3: Rolling test for variance homogeneity in the MAD change of inflation, continued  
Notes: The upper right percentage presented in each graph indicates the percentage of time that the process is in-control for each 
country or group of countries. When the line is below the 0.01 critical limit it is implied that the process is in-control, while if the 
opposite is true the process is out of control.     
 
 
For the second hypothesis (significant changes in the variability of inflation are less frequent in 
IT countries), the coefficient of the IT dummy ( ,IT iD ) is now negative (0.896) and again insignifi-
cant (see specification 2 in Table 3). This finding implies that IT countries do not appear to control 
changes in the variability of inflation in a more effective way than other countries do. Again, the 
quality of institutions ( iQ ) is significant at the 0.1 significance level. Finally, for the third hypoth-
esis discussed above (IT countries are significantly better than other countries at achieving jointly a 
change in the persistence and control in the variability of inflation), the emerging significance 
pattern is identical to that in the previous two cases. Specifically, the IT dummy ( ,IT iD ) is negative 
(0.479) and insignificant, while the quality of institutions ( iQ ) continues to be significant (see 
specification 3 in Table 3). 
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All these inferences could be questionable if the specifications estimated do not pass the neces-
sary diagnostic tests. In other words, when we adopt the Maximum Likelihood approach to estimate 
a model’s coefficients, certain types of misspecification, such as the assumed symmetry of the 
logistic function or the presence of heteroskedastic errors, may heavily influence the credibility of 
our inferences. Logit models are misspecified and deliver inconsistent estimates if the distribution 
of the error term does not meet the assumption of symmetry. Therefore, we use an LM type test (see 
Thomas, 1993) to examine the symmetry assumption imposed by the underlying logistic distri-
bution. In all three specifications, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of symmetry (see the Burr 
Type 2 LM test in Table 3), revealing the use of the logit specification to be a rational choice. 
Additionally, we test the null hypothesis that the specification is the logistic over a more general 
functional form using a RESET type LM test, as proposed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1984; 
2004). Again, for all three specifications, we fail to reject the null at the conventional levels of sig-
nificance (see the RESET LM test in Table 3), further supporting the use of the logit model. 
Another matter of concern is the possible presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term, an 
issue that may result in inconsistent estimates. For this reason, we carry out the LM type test for 
heteroskedasticity as illustrated in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004). The LM test is conducted for 
all three of the specifications (see in Table 3 the Hetero. LM test) and fails to reject the null hypoth-
esis of homoskedasticity. Finally, we test for the exogeneity of the binary IT dummy ( ,IT iD ) by 
conducting a Hausman type LR test as described in Knapp and Seaks (1998).
16
 To execute the test 
for the three specifications of interest (see section 2.3), we use an appropriate instrument for each 
specification. In the first specification, we instrument the IT dummy ( ,IT iD ) on the median value of 
inflation before the FAD or the EBD depending on whether the country is an IT country or not. In 
the second specification, we instrument the IT dummy ( ,IT iD ) on the MAD value of inflation before 
the FAD or the EBD depending on the country, while in the third specification both of these two 
instruments are employed jointly. In this manner, we create three distinct systems of equations, each 
of which contains two equations.
17
 To attain consistent estimates for the parameters, we estimate 
each system through the Full Information Maximum Likelihood approach. Once we obtain the esti-
mates, we test for the exogeneity ( , 0 u )
18
 of the IT dummy ( ,IT iD ) in the three systems. In all 
cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the regressor of interest is exogenous.  
Overall, we provide econometric evidence that the IT regime has no significant effect on the 
change in the persistence of the annualised inflation series from I(1) to I(0)
19
. Additionally, the IT 
regime seems to provide no advantage in controlling changes in the variability of inflation more 
effectively. Furthermore, our results imply that the quality of institutions matters more than the 
monetary policy announcement. The reported findings need to be treated with some degree of 
caution since many non-targeting countries in our sample implement policies that are close to those 
of the IT countries.  
                                                 
16 
Knapp and Seaks (1998) propose a method for testing exogeneity for a dichotomous right-hand side variable in a 
probit specification.   
17 
We present the three systems analytically in the notes section of Table 3.  
18
 
,

u
 is the correlation of the error terms that correspond to the two equations of the system. 
19
 Central Bank Independence was also proposed as a way to tame inflation. In a literature conceptually similar to 
IT, Forder (1998) points out that: “The test might appear to show a statistical regularity, say between the content of the 
statutes of a central bank and the rate of inflation, but in the absence of a theoretical connection that would be of no 
interest. We might note that the European German-speaking countries (Germany, Switzerland, and Austria) have low 
inflation. This does not mean that if we all started speaking German, inflation would fall”. 
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Table 3: Binary Logit estimates  
Independent 
variables 
 Dependent variable  Dependent variable  Dependent variable 
 1D   2D   3D  
 
ML estimates 
specification (1) 
 
ML estimates 
specification (2) 
 
ML estimates 
specification (3) 
           
c   0.883**  0.205*  1.261** 
ITD   -2.647**  0.896*  0.479** 
Q   -2.291**  -0.799*  -1.248** 
          
Regression diagnostics 
          
McFadden R
2 
 0.228   0.120   0.160  
LR stat.  7.173   7.454   9.968  
LR stat. p-value  0.027   0.024   0.006  
Log-likelihood  12.111   27.364   26.107  
Burr Type 2 LM test    0.207   0.308   2.023  
Burr Type 2 LM test p-value  0.648   0.578   0.155  
Hetero. LM test   3.147   0.525   2.318  
Hetero. LM test p-value  0.207   0.769   0.314  
RESET LM test  0.335   0.448   1.340  
RESET LM test p-value   0.737   0.633   0.180  
LR stat. for exogeneity (
ITD )  2.654   0.228   0.101  
LR stat. for exogeneity p-value  0.103   0.633   0.751  
 
Notes: The system used to test for exogeneity in (1) is: 
1 1,0 1,1 , 1,2 1,
   
IT i i i
D b b D b Q  and 
, 1,3 1,4 1,
  
b
IT i i i
D b b M u . Similarly, the system in the specification (2) is: 
2 2 ,0 2 ,1 , 2 ,2 2 ,
   
IT i i i
D b b D b Q  and 
, 2 ,3 2 ,4 2 ,
  
b
IT i i i
D b b AD u , while for specification (3) is: 
3 3,0 3,1 , 3,2 3,
   
IT i i i
D b b D b Q  and 
, 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,
   
b b
IT i i i i
D b b M b AD u . 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Inflation targeting has become an important tool for monetary policy. There have been at least 
two possible explanations for the significant reduction in inflation and inflation variability 
that has been observed in the past decades. One argument is that it is an outcome of the great 
moderation, while the alternative is that inflation targeting was the catalyst for the change 
observed in the persistence of inflation. 
This paper employs a test for change in persistence to examine whether the stationarity 
properties of inflation have changed. We use data from forty-five countries and three groups 
of countries (the G7, OECD Europe, and the OECD). We consider a change in persistence 
from I(0) to I(1) and vice versa. The evidence that emerges supports a change in persistence 
from I(1) to (0) in most of the cases. The methodology employed, allows us to date the break 
in the stationarity properties, and we then compare the estimated break date from the test for 
change in persistence with the formal adoption date of inflation targeting. Graphical analysis 
indicates that the two dates did not overlap. Logit analysis indicates that IT does not affect the 
change in persistence in a statistically significant way. Quality of government is examined as 
an alternative driver and it emerges as significant for the change in persistence. 
The second part of the analysis employs a test to monitor whether inflation variability is in-
control. IT adopters are compared with non-IT adopters. Logit analysis does not provide any 
evidence that inflation targeters are associated with more control of the variability of inflation. 
The quality of institutions seems to reduce inflation variability in a statistically significant 
way. When we consider both (i) a change in inflation persistence and (ii) being in-control of 
inflation variability, IT is again not found to be statistically significant, whereas the quality of 
institutions is. 
Overall, the evidence provided suggests that (i) a change in the persistence of inflation and 
(ii) lower variability in inflation have both occurred but inflation targeting did not make a 
statistically significant contribution to either. The quality of institutions emerges as a more 
significant driver of the change in the persistence of inflation and of lower inflation vari-
ability. Our results do not argue against inflation targeting policies, but rather we view the 
quality of central banks and institutions as a vital element in ensuring economic and financial 
stability since the recent financial crisis, where near-zero interest rates are observed. This 
issue has recently been taken up by Balls et al. (2016) among others, and they argue that 
central banks need to work more closely with a range of institutions, including the govern-
ment, at monetary-fiscal coordination, monetary-debt management coordination, and systemic 
risk monitoring. With this in mind, we also note fresh research by Fazio et al. (2015), who 
argue that IT national banking systems are more stable, possess sounder systemically impor-
tant banks, and are less distressed than, or at least no more distressed than, other banking 
systems during periods where global liquidity shortages emerge. The research agenda on all 
these issues definitely has plenty to offer. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Test for a shift in inflation variance   
Country Sample 
split date 
Split date 
nature 
Obs. before 
split date 
Obs. after 
split date 
Var. before split 
date 
Var. after 
split date 
Watson U
2
 statistic (p-
value) 
Brown-Forsythe statistic  
(p-value) 
Euro area countries 
         
Austria  1987m05 EBD 088 278 0003.998 00.997 00.910 (0.000) 100.186 (0.000) 
Belgium 1987m10 EBD 093 273 0007.091 01.161 03.104 (0.000) 091.075 (0.000) 
Cyprus 1987m03 EBD 086 280 0016.551 02.649 01.529 (0.000) 112.394 (0.000) 
Finland 1994m05 EBD 172 194 0010.504 01.188 01.853 (0.000) 125.277 (0.000) 
France 1992m05 EBD 148 218 0017.785 00.527 06.933 (0.000) 145.564 (0.000) 
Germany  1994m03 EBD 170 196 0003.955 00.526 01.424 (0.000) 133.413 (0.000) 
Greece 1999m10 EBD 237 129 0042.721 00.856 02.503 (0.000) 207.013 (0.000) 
Ireland  1987m06 EBD 089 277 0042.484 02.194 05.703 (0.000) 235.616 (0.000) 
Italy 1996m09 EBD 200 166 0030.888 00.461 04.744 (0.000) 090.028 (0.000) 
Luxembourg  1988m04 EBD 099 267 0012.758 01.015 02.290 (0.000) 226.426 (0.000) 
Malta 1986m05 EBD 076 290 0042.410 01.535 02.717 (0.000) 194.774 (0.000) 
Netherlands  1988m06 EBD 101 265 0007.469 00.872 01.646 (0.000) 222.508 (0.000) 
Portugal  1995m10 EBD 189 177 0056.242 01.578 03.087 (0.000) 161.726 (0.000) 
Slovakia  2002m04 MID 099 099 0011.821 06.343 00.316 (0.001) 004.441 (0.036) 
Slovenia  2000m10 MID 117 117 6096.528 06.769 10.446 (0.000) 026.086 (0.000) 
Spain 1995m07 EBD 186 180 0014.859 01.554 02.655 (0.000) 107.665 (0.000) 
        
Inflation-targeting countries 
        
Australia 1993Q01 FAD 052 070 0009.389 02.021 00.701 (0.000) 022.474 (0.000) 
Brazil 1999m06 FAD 222 133          1.45×10
6 
09.457 12.181 (0.000) 040.768 (0.000) 
Canada 1991m01 FAD 132 234 0009.537 01.576 02.654 (0.000) 049.366 (0.000) 
Chile 1990m09 FAD 128 233 0067.593 37.945 01.666 (0.000) 014.299 (0.000) 
Colombia 1999m09 FAD 236 130 0022.446 03.699 02.207 (0.000) 084.246 (0.000) 
Czech Republic 1998m01 FAD 048 150 0001.167 02.917 00.967 (0.000) 010.775 (0.000) 
Ghana 2007m05 FAD 328 038 0950.615 14.065 05.959 (0.000) 012.097 (0.000) 
Hungary 2001m06 FAD 257 109 0076.224 03.425 02.608 (0.000) 144.757 (0.000) 
Iceland 2001m03 FAD 206 112 0150.875 16.127 03.698 (0.000) 038.339 (0.000) 
Indonesia 2005m07 FAD 306 060 0147.849 21.711 09.284 (0.000) 000.820 (0.366) 
         
 
 30 
Table A1: Test for a shift in inflation variance, continued  
Country Sample 
split date 
Split date 
nature 
Obs. before 
split date 
Obs. after 
split date 
Var. before split 
date 
Var. after 
split date 
Watson U
2
 statistic (p-
value) 
Brown-Forsythe statistic  
(p-value) 
Inflation-targeting countries (continued) 
         
Israel  1992m01 FAD 144 222 000001.48×10
4
 21.467 11.743 (0.000) 228.103 (0.000) 
Korea 1998m04 FAD 219 147 0046.978 02.331 06.475 (0.000) 030.689 (0.000) 
Mexico  1999m01 FAD 228 138 1570.168 13.588 05.345 (0.000) 086.431 (0.000) 
N. Zealand 1990Q01 FAD 040 082 0026.295 02.008 01.833 (0.000) 115.382 (0.000) 
Norway 2001m03 FAD 254 112 0012.867 01.703 02.892 (0.000) 059.012 (0.000) 
Peru  2002m01 FAD 264 102 000001.27×10
6 
03.446 20.708 (0.000) 011.592 (0.000) 
Philippines 2002m01 FAD 264 102 0119.039 02.669 05.066 (0.000) 016.252 (0.000) 
Poland 1998m10 FAD 117 141 000007.30×10
4
 08.237 13.138 (0.000) 023.547 (0.000) 
Romania 2005m08 FAD 166 059 7178.761 02.912 04.428 (0.000) 036.953 (0.000) 
S. Africa 2000m02 FAD 241 125 0014.983 10.147 00.495 (0.000) 008.433 (0.004) 
Sweden 1993m01 FAD 156 210 0010.585 01.979 01.902 (0.000) 093.385 (0.000) 
Switzerland 2000m01 FAD 240 126 0004.023 00.666 01.725 (0.000) 119.699 (0.000) 
Thailand 2000m05 FAD 244 122 0019.476 04.930 02.254 (0.000) 011.628 (0.001) 
Turkey 2006m01 FAD 312 054 0760.097 03.978 00.602 (0.000) 080.102 (0.000) 
UK 1992m10 FAD 153 213 0017.133 01.558 03.743 (0.000) 074.777 (0.000) 
        
Other countries & Groups 
        
China 1999m06 EBD 065 133 0095.179 06.125 02.727 (0.000) 141.764 (0.000) 
Denmark  1990m03 EBD 122 244 0010.592 00.378 05.286 (0.000) 181.461 (0.000) 
Japan 1992m09 EBD 152 214 0004.185 00.932 01.171 (0.000) 037.362 (0.000) 
US 1987m01 EBD 084 282 0016.322 01.757 03.975 (0.000) 095.337 (0.000) 
G7 1992m04 EBD 147 219 0008.942 00.722 03.645 (0.000) 062.568 (0.000) 
OECD EU 2002m12 EBD 275 091 0007.811 00.676 00.498 (0.000) 036.037 (0.000) 
OECD 1998m07 EBD 222 144 0007.467 01.064 00.736 (0.000) 058.016 (0.000) 
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Table A2: Rolling test for variance homogeneity (in-control) in the MAD change in inflation   
Country Institutions quality 
(1996–2010 average) 
Sample size after the 
split date 
MAD rolling 
window size  
Rolling window size to test 
for shifts in variance 
% of observations  
in-control at 0.01 
Euro area countries 
 
Austria  -1.856 1987m05–2010m06 24 months 48 months 088 
Belgium -1.744 1987m10–2010m06 24 months 48 months 083 
Cyprus -1.293 1987m03–2010m06 24 months 48 months 096 
Finland -2.121 1994m05–2010m06 24 months 48 months 091 
France -1.596 1992m05–2010m06 24 months 48 months 095 
Germany  -1.651 1994m03–2010m06 24 months 48 months 090 
Greece -0.692 1994m10–2010m06 24 months 48 months 097 
Ireland  -1.582 1987m06–2010m06 24 months 48 months 068 
Italy -0.589 1996m09–2010m06 24 months 48 months 064 
Luxembourg  -1.829 1988m04–2010m06 24 months 48 months 089 
Malta -1.048 1986m05–2010m06 24 months 48 months 074 
Netherlands  -1.911 1988m06–2010m06 24 months 48 months 089 
Portugal  -1.072 1995m10–2010m06 24 months 48 months 091 
Slovakia -0.751 2004m12–2010m06 24 months 48 months 018 
Slovenia  -0.964 2000m10–2010m06 24 months 48 months 100 
Spain -1.368 1995m07–2010m06 24 months 48 months 094 
 
Inflation-targeting countries 
 
Australia -1.765 1993Q01–2010Q02 08 quarters 16 quarters 094 
Brazil -0.057 1999m06–2010m06 24 months 48 months 060 
Canada -1.885 1991m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 096 
Chile -1.198 1990m09–2010m06 24 months 48 months 078 
Colombia -0.164 1999m09–2010m06 24 months 48 months 066 
Czech Republic -0.866 1998m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 059 
Ghana* -0.061 2007m05–2010m06 06 months 24 months 060 
Hungary -0.839 2001m06–2010m06 12 months 48 months 058 
Iceland -1.892 2001m03–2010m06 12 months 48 months 100 
Indonesia -0.360 2005m07–2010m06 06 months 24 months 061 
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Table A2: Rolling test for variance homogeneity (in-control) in the MAD change, continued 
Country 
Institutions quality 
(1996–2010 average) 
Sample size after the 
split date 
MAD rolling 
window size  
Rolling window size to test 
for shifts in variance 
% of observations  
in-control at 0.01 
Inflation-targeting countries (continued) 
 
Israel  -1.206 1992m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 078 
Korea -0.926 1998m04–2010m06 24 months 48 months 087 
Mexico  -0.184 1999m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 084 
N. Zealand -1.765 1990Q01–2010Q02 08 quarters 16 quarters 080 
Norway -1.933 2001m03–2010m06 24 months 48 months 076 
Peru  –0.323 2002m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 100 
Philippines –0.057 2002m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 055 
Poland -0.545 1998m10–2010m06 24 months 48 months 100 
Romania –0.330 2005m08–2010m06 06 months 24 months 073 
S. Africa -0.599 2000m02–2010m06 24 months 48 months 079 
Sweden -1.996 1993m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 075 
Switzerland -1.989 2000m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 100 
Thailand -0.294 2000m05–2010m06 24 months 48 months 078 
Turkey -0.112 2006m01–2010m06 06 months 24 months 073 
UK -1.756 1992m10–2010m06 24 months 48 months 058 
 
Other countries & Groups 
 
China 0.002 1999m06–2010m06 24 months 48 months 079 
Denmark  2.155 1990m03–2010m06 24 months 48 months 090 
Japan 1.312 1992m09–2010m06 24 months 48 months 073 
US 1.661 1987m01–2010m06 24 months 48 months 067 
G7 - 1992m04–2010m06 24 months 48 months 091 
OECD EU - 2002m12–2010m06 24 months 48 months 070 
OECD - 1998m07–2010m06 24 months 48 months 089 
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